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ABSTRACT: This paper situates Hume’s views on animals in the context of the
Scottish Enlightenment by contrasting them with the views of Adam Smith. While
Smith is more central to the philosophical establishment of the Scottish
Enlightenment, their views on morals resemble each other greatly and both think
that the analogies between humans and non-human animals are useful for thinking
about morals. Their estimation of the nature and extent of those analogies,
however, differ widely from one another. This has been historically obscured by the
fact that in no single work does Smith precisely detail what he thinks non-human
animals are capable of. I argue that Smith thinks non-human animal minds are
different in kind from human minds. This is evident from Smith’s view of how
language facilitates and co-creates certain aspects of human cognition. Hume, by
contrast, seems to hold that non-human animal minds differ merely by degree from
human minds. After reconstructing Smith’s view, I contrast it with Hume’s,
providing historical context to show how Hume falls outside the mainstream on this
issue and Smith within it. Their views on animals reflect, broadly, their standing with
respect to the wider Scottish philosophical community.
KEYWORDS: Hume, David; Smith, Adam; animals; animal cognition; animal minds;
Scottish Enlightenment; language; analogy;

INTRODUCTION
It is widely believed that Hume’s views of the nature and status of animals were
directly influenced by the skeptical thinkers that preceded him. This influence is
usually located in Sextus, Montaigne, and Bayle, or some combination thereof.1 But
Hume’s views on animals are also in dialogue with his more immediate context, the

1

See, e.g., Kail (2012), Kemp Smith (2005, 325), Floridi (1997), Muckler (1963), and Seidler (1977).
For an assessment of these claims of direct influence on Hume’s arguments regarding animals, see
Fry (forthcoming).
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Scottish Enlightenment.2 Adam Smith makes for an intriguing comparison with
Hume on this issue. On morals, both Smith and Hume form their respective views in
dialogue with Hutcheson, and both Smith and Hume think that examining the
analogies between humans and non-human animals will enlighten our moral
theorizing.
Smith repeatedly references the abilities of non-human animals in
comparison with humans. Sometimes this is done to illustrate what the two groups
share, sometimes it is done with an eye to illuminating what makes humans special.
Unlike Hume, though, Smith never gives a direct accounting of animal mental
capabilities: his overall view of non-human animal mentality is left largely implicit.
In this paper, I collate Smith’s claims about non-human animal minds to
show that they share some key capacities with human minds, on Smith’s view. I then
go on to argue that, despite this, Smith is committed to the view that human and
non-human animal minds are different in kind. This is due to Smith’s understanding
of language’s effect on human cognition: for Smith, language is a uniquely human
capability that extends and produces many human cognitive abilities. Thus,
ultimately, humans have radically different cognitive capabilities from non-human
animals. I then contrast Smith with Hume, arguing that Hume has a view whereby
human and non-human animal minds differ only by degree. I conclude by suggesting
that Hume’s comparatively more radical and Smith’s comparatively more
conservative view mirror their positions with respect to the Scottish Enlightenment’s
mainstream philosophical establishment.

I. SMITH’S CLAIMS ABOUT ANIMALS
At key points in Smith’s major works, he draws analogies between human and nonhuman animal mentality. Early in Wealth of Nations, Smith identifies a ‘propensity to
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another’ as an aspect of human nature
(WN I.ii.1, p.25).3 Smith says of this capability that we cannot be sure whether it is
‘one of those original principles in human nature, of which no further account can
be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of
the faculties of reason and speech.’ Examining the origin of this faculty is not
Smith’s task, he asserts, but he does note that
Wolloch (2006) treats Hume’s views on animals in the context of the Scottish Enlightenment, but
does so primarily in relation to Scottish physician John Gregory, not Smith, though Smith, too, is
addressed there.
2

3

An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations will be referenced as Wealth of Nations or
WN throughout and cited by book, chapter and paragraph number, followed by page numbers, as is
conventional. Page references are to Smith (1976).
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It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of
animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of
contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have
sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each
turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her
when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not
the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their
passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a
dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another
with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and
natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to
give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either
of a man or of another animal, it has no other means of persuasion
but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy
fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours by a thousand
attractions to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner,
when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts
with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging
them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile
and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time,
however, to do this upon every occasion… In almost every other
race of animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is
intirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the
assistance of no other living creatures. But man has almost constant
occasion for the help of his brethren… (WN I.ii.2, p.25-6)
Here Smith makes several comparisons between humans and non-human animals.
First, he identifies the propensity that he has noted for ‘truck, barter and exchange’ is
unique to human nature, and supposes that it is a ‘necessary consequence of the
faculties of reason and speech.’ Thus, on Smith’s estimation, non-human animals do
not have reason, or they do not have speech, or they do not have either; if they did,
he could not suppose that the human propensity to barter is a ‘natural consequence’
of possessing those two faculties.
Smith goes on to give his reasons for thinking that the propensity for barter
is related to reason and speech and also his reason to think that this propensity is
unique to humans. He notes first that, though there appears to be action orchestrated
toward shared ends in non-human animals—as when two greyhounds chase prey,
each coursing it toward the other—this is a result of the ‘accidental concurrence of
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their passions’ not any pre-existing agreement between the two.4 Further, no gesture
or speech-equivalent was ever observed that indicated that animals had notions of
ownership and/or trade.5
That non-human animals do not engage in exchange is not a failure of
intelligence, though, as Smith’s description of related phenomena in the Lectures on
Jurisprudence shows. There, Smith says of barter:
The brutes have no notion of this; the dogs, as I mentiond, by having
the same object in their view sometimes unite their labours, but never
from contract. The same is seen still more strongly in the manner in
which the monkeys rob an orchard at the Cape of Good Hope.—But
after they have very ingeniously conveyd [sic] away the apples, as they
have no contract they fight (even unto death) and leave after many
dead upon the spot. They have no other way of gaining their end but
by gaining ones favour by fawning and flattering. (LJ ms.iv.57, p.
352-3)6
The monkeys described here are ‘ingenious’ at robbing the orchard of apples but still
fail to form a contract because they lack language (and can only gain each other’s
favor through fawning). Smith again locates the difference between these animals
and humans in the ability to speak, which is what enables humans to form contracts
and act in concert.7 Elsewhere Smith makes clear that he takes speech to be unique
to humans, though, interestingly, perhaps not foundational:
The desire of being believed, the desire of persuading, of leading
and directing other people, seems to be one of the strongest of all
our natural desires. It is, perhaps, the instinct upon which is founded
the faculty of speech, the characteristical faculty of human nature.
No other animal possesses this faculty, and we cannot discover in any

4

For a comparison with the similar passage in Hume, see Henderson (2006, 31-4).

Smith also makes this analogy with the greyhounds and lack of exchange in dogs in Lectures on
Jurisprudence (LJ) ms.218-221 (p.492-493.) Throughout, Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence will be cited by
manuscript page as is conventional with page numbers in Smith (1978) following.
5

6

Smith summarizes these points again at LJ ms.222, p.494.

Schleisser (2017, 30) reads the passage in much the same way: Smith here is indicating that animals
are intelligent, but lack speech and cannot form contracts.
7
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other animal any desire to lead and direct the judgment and conduct
of its fellows. (TMS VII.iv.25, p.397-8)8
For Smith, then, speech—and not reason—is the ‘characteristical’ faculty of
humanity. This matches what we saw above. The use of speech to create contracts
and bonds, for Smith, is tied to the fact that humans are (nearly) unique insofar as
they are not entirely independent of one another in adulthood.9 Compared to
humans, non-human animals have different economic, social and political
arrangements amongst themselves because they lack speech. This lack means that
they are not able to associate for mutual benefit by anything other than accidental
confluence of passions.
But as the passages above show, the problem is not that animals lack
intelligence. Smith thinks that humans and non-human animals are both capable of a
kind of means-ends reasoning: humans and non-human animals share the ability to
seek their ends, both through their direct actions and through ‘servile and fawning
attention.’ The latter provides a clear case of both humans and non-human animals
framing a goal and executing on a plan to achieve it, as they both ingratiate
themselves to others in order to ‘gain the favour of those whose service’ they
require.
Smith clearly thinks that non-human animals possess intentions and desires
and, further, can represent what needs to change in the world to fulfill those desires,
as they can take actions meant to achieve the ends they represent to themselves.
Humans and non-human animals, on Smith’s view, share a basic ability to suit means
to ends. Thus, while humans and non-human animals differ widely from one
another, on Smith’s view, they share much cognitively in common.

II. SMITH’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT ANIMALS
But how does Smith arrive at these conclusions? That is, by what reasoning does
Smith come to think of non-human animals as having these capabilities in particular?
The Theory of Moral Sentiments will be cited (as convention dictates) by TMS with part, section and
paragraph numbers (along with chapter numbers where appropriate). Page numbers referencing Smith
(2002) follow.
8

Later Smith argues that though there is a strong and consistent human nature, the differences
humans have from one another contribute to their well-being precisely because they are not
independent of one another as other animals are; see WN I.ii.5, p.29-30. Smith makes this same
comparison elsewhere with the same context (LJ ms.vi.47-49, p.348-9). In that exposition, though, the
claim of a strong and consistent human nature is made more forcefully, as is the claim of mutual
benefit among differently-endowed humans.
9

5 / 21

Smith does not say. Because Smith does not offer a direct or comprehensive account
of animal cognition (like, e.g., Hume does across Treatise 1.3.16, 2.1.12, and 2.2.12),
one must look to his philosophical methodology generally and the other explicit
arguments that draw on claims about animals.
The one place that Smith makes explicit and direct arguments about animal mental
capacities is his essay ‘Of the External Senses.’10 In the essay, Smith considers each
of the five senses and examines whether its use would require representations of
something external or apart from us. In the concluding section, ‘Of the sense of
seeing,’ Smith examines the evidence for the claim that the human tendency to
identify objects seen as being external to oneself must arise from habituation alone.11
Smith will reject this claim, and will do so on the basis of arguments that
prominently feature non-human animals.
Here, Smith gives scientifically informed arguments by analogy when
considering animal capabilities. Smith argues that non-human animals must have
some innate ability to navigate the world and that this would require them to be able
to innately identify visual stimuli as depicting something external to them. He then
argues by analogy that this must be the case for humans as well.
Smith builds his case by considering the habits and capabilities of the young
of several different sorts of animals:
That, antecedent to all experience, the young of at least the greater
part of animals possess some instinctive perception of this kind,
seems abundantly evident. The hen never feeds her young by
dropping food into their bills… Almost as soon as her chickens are
hatched, she does not feed them, but carries them to the field to feed,
where they walk about at their ease, it would seem, and appear to
have the most distinct perception of all the tangible objects which
surround them… The young of the partridge and of the grouse
seem to have the same early period… The young partridge, almost as
soon as it comes from the shell, runs about among long grass and
corn; the young grouse among long heath, and would both most
essentially hurt themselves if they had not the most acute as well as
distinct perception of the tangible objects which not only surround
Cited throughout as ES with paragraph numbers, followed by page numbers in Smith (1980). There
has been some suggestion that ‘Of the External Senses’ is a juvenile work and thus not worthy of
serious consideration, but Brown (1992) gives a convincing rebuttal. For a discussion see Glenney
(2011, n.2), who concludes that Smith at least returned to and edited the work well into his career.
10

For a complete discussion of Smith’s arguments and goals in discussing the external world, see
Glenney (2011) and Glenney (2007).
11
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them but press upon them on all sides. This is the case too with the
young of the goose, of the duck, and, so far as I have been able to
observe, with those of at least the greater part of the birds which
make their nests upon the ground. (ES 70, p.161-162)
Similarly, birds who roost in bushes and on cliffs, though they ‘come blind from the
shell,’ just as soon as they are granted the power of sight at all, they
evidently enjoy all the powers of Vision in the most complete
perfection, and can distinguish with most exact precision the shape
and proportion of the tangible objects which every visible one
represents. In so short a period, they cannot be supposed to have
acquired those powers from experience, and must therefore derive
them from some instinctive suggestion. The sight of birds seems to
be both more prompt and more acute than that of any other animals.
(ES 71, p.162)
Smith assess quadrupeds similarly, arguing that the same patterns are found in them.
Like ground birds, the young quadruped ‘seems to enjoy from the beginning,’ the
power of sight ‘in as great perfection as he ever does afterwards’ (ES 73, p.163).
Smith gives several examples, and then notes that while some are born blind, they
acquire their sight in full immediately on the reception of it in any degree, just as
with birds that nest up high.
Smith then analogizes humans and these non-human animals, saying ‘It
seems difficult to suppose that man is the only animal of which the young are not
endowed with some instinctive perception of this kind’ (ES 74, p.163). Thus, Smith
argues, because of the overwhelming similarities between humans and non-human
animals, we should accept that when humans come to have sight, they immediately
come to represent external objects as being external. Thus, such representations are
instinctual and not learned, even in humans.
Smith then addresses the objection that nature ‘never bestows upon any
animal any faculty which is not either necessary or useful,’ and that human children’s
long state of dependence on adults allows time for mere mental association or
habituation to do the work that instinct does in other animals. Smith’s response is to
appeal again to observation:
Children, however, appear at so very early a period to know the
distance, the shape, and magnitude of the different tangible objects
which are presented to them, that I am disposed to believe that even
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they may have some instinctive perception of this kind. (ES 74, p.
163)
This is the case even though, as Smith allows, it may be to ‘a much weaker degree
than the greater part of other animals.’ Smith then focuses on other observations of
infants, leaving non-human animals behind.12
In sum, Smith argues by analogy that because the power of vision is
evidently coupled from a very early age with representing external objects as external
in non-human animals that it must also be so in humans. He is willing to give up or
mitigate a well-worn principle (that nature does not give animals any extraneous
capabilities) to square this account with his observations of human infants and nonhuman animal young. Smith’s reasoning is analogical and responsive to scientific
observation. He sees humans and non-human animals as similar enough in other
respects to underwrite claims about cognitive similarities.
Smith is part of a long tradition in deploying arguments of this sort.13 Smith,
though, is in some ways the best suited of all of these thinkers to make use of this
mode of reasoning, given the importance he places on analogy in scientific
reasoning. In his History of Astronomy, he makes analogy the key to philosophico-

For the role that analogies with children play in Smith’s conjectural history elsewhere, see
Swearingen (2013, 169).
12

13

Most thinkers in the period argue for claims about the mental capabilities of non-human animals by
analogizing them to humans. That is, many thinkers—including, but not limited to, Montaigne,
Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, Bayle, and Hume—note similarities between human and non-human animal
behavior and use these similarities to argue analogically for claims about the cognitive capacities of
one or both groups.
For primary texts, see Montaigne’s Apology for Raimond Seybond (2003, 15-47), Hobbes’s Leviathan (1994)
ch.1-6, Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1976) Book II, ch.ix-xi, the corresponding
sections of Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding (1996), the entry for ‘Rorarius’ in Bayle’s
Historical and Critical Dictionary, and Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature 1.3.16, 2.1.12, 2.2.12 and Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding 9.
For analysis, see Fry (forthcoming) and also Kail (2007). As a survey, Wilson (1995) is also useful.
Note that Descartes’s mode of reasoning is also analogical, though he weights the differences and
disanalogies between the groups as most important (Discourse on Method, AT 55-60).
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scientific reasoning.14 Reducing to a bare minimum the number of principles and
kinds of hypotheses that are required to connect together the observed phenomena
is both the fundamental goal and good-making feature of analogical reasoning.
Smith’s arguments about animals display the implicit premise that because human
and non-human animal behavior can be explained largely with the same principles, it
ought to be. Differences in underlying cognitive capabilities should be posited only
when they are absolutely required to account for observed differences, and the
differences in cognitive capability should be as minimal as possible while maintaining
empirical adequacy.
Smith’s claims about animals’ ‘fawning attention’ above illustrate just this
form of reasoning: the same strategy is common to both humans and non-human
animals and is given the same diagnosis in both. Differences are posited only when
required to explain why humans do not do this on some occasions. The ability to
speak is the underlying difference in this case, but it is appealed to only to explain
higher level differences.
This explains why Smith thinks humans and non-human animals share
cognitive capacities: because analogy is the fundamental mode of philosophicoscientific reasoning and because humans and non-human animals share behaviors
associated with, e.g., means-ends reasoning, we ought to, on Smith’s understanding,
attribute the underlying capacities requires for those behaviors to non-human
animals.
However, there are still differences between the two groups: humans and
non-human animals are both cognitive beings, for Smith, but linguistic ability is a key
difference between them. While much of our behavior is analogous, and thus we
should attribute similar underlying cognitive causes for that behavior, humans are
linguistic and animals are not. This, I argue in the following section, shows Smith to
think of the difference between human and non-human animal minds as a difference
in kind, not a difference of degree. Though we are both minded, thinking beings for
Smith, humans and non-human animals have different sorts of minds.

See HA II.12, p.45. Smith’s History of Astronomy will be cited, as is conventional, by section and
paragraph number. Page references to Smith 1980 follow. Analogy reduces the riot of seeming
irregularities, confusions and distractions by introducing order by systematizing phenomena. By
‘smoothing the passage of the imagination’ systematization renders unfamiliar or seemingly
discordant sets of phenomena in terms of transitions which the mind naturally accepts, that is,
connections between events with which it is familiar (HA II.12, p.47). When analogy was deployed
well and consistently, it ‘became the great hinge upon which every thing turned’ (HA II.12, p.46-7).
All philosophico-scientific reasoning, according to Smith, is analogical. On this point, see Thomson
(1965, 225-6).
14
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III: FOR SMITH, A DIFFERENCE IN KIND
To consider the question of difference, we first must assess the role that language
plays in human cognition for Smith. Fortunately, there is already work on this topic.
Schliesser (2011), for instance, argues that, for Smith, ‘language and mind codevelop.’ Looking at Smith’s ‘Considerations Concerning the First Formation of
Languages’ shows this.15 There Smith gives a conjectural history of the way that
language developed, starting first with names of events and objects, then kinds and
adjectives, and so on.16
Smith believes that, e.g., naming of particular objects generates the cognitive
need—and the cognitive capacity—to use general names. The use of general names
then requires distinguishing individuals within kinds, bringing online new cognitive
capacities, which then facilitate further language growth. The process repeats for
qualities, relations, etc. For Smith, language enables cognitive capacities that would
otherwise not be present, and those capacities go on to sharpen the linguistic tools
available, which in turn enable further cognitive capacities and so on. Fundamentally,
some of our cognitive capacities depend on our language. The capabilities enabled
by speech include, e.g., the ability to think about kinds, qualities, relations, numbers
as abstracted from concrete quantities, the ability to think of the self as an
individual, and the greater part of metaphysics.17
Human and non-human animal behavior and its causes (on Smith’s
estimation) are very similar.18 Given those similarities and Smith’s commitment to
analogy, we should expect that human and non-human mentality will be explained in
very similar ways. But remember that Smith’s commitment to analogy can be
Originally published as a free-standing essay, Smith later thought it so important that he appended it
to the 3rd edition of Theory of Moral Sentiments. ‘Considerations Concerning the First Formation of
Languages’ will be cited as Languages, with page numbers referencing Smith (1853).
15

For thorough consideration of the structure, argumentation and context of this essay, see Land
(1977) and Swearingen (2013).
16

17

See Languages p.515-21, p.529.

18

Further analogies than those already discussed include, e.g., that both have propensities fit to their
self-preservation and the propagation of their species (TMS II.i.v.10, p.90). Both strike out at things
that injure them (TMS II.iii.i.1, p.110). Smith notes that we rank non-human animals as similar enough
to us to be suited to punishment, or, at least, more similar than inanimate objects and so more
deserving (TMS II.iii.i.3-4, p.111-2). (On this point, see also the related passage at LJ ii.177 (p.139), see
also LJ ii.118-9 (p.116).) We work similarly, and deserve similar appellations: Smith, for instance,
identifies both farmhands and cattle as ‘productive labourers’ in the field. (WN II.v.12, p.363-4). For a
discussion of this passage, see Pesciarelli (1999).
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overridden or mitigated by difference in the capacities that are needed to explain the
observed behavior. This is what we saw with the passages from Wealth of Nations,
where Smith attributes enough underlying capacity difference to explain the
difference in observed behavior.
Despite their similarity, in ‘Of the External Senses’ Smith says that humans
are indeed superior to non-human animals, and that this is by nature’s design:
…and [a human] at no time takes any further concern in it than he is
obliged to do by that fellow-feeling which Nature has, for the wisest
purposes, implanted in man, not only towards all other men, but
(though no doubt in a much weaker degree) towards all other
animals. Having destined him to be the governing animal in this little
world, it seems to have been her benevolent intention to inspire him
with some degree of respect, even for the meanest and weakest of
his subjects. (ES, p.136)
Humans and non-human animals are ‘destined’ by nature for different ends. As such,
they have different capacities. While human nature may develop over time as a result
of social and linguistic activity, for Smith, it has within it the capacities that
(inevitably) bring about the dominion of humans over the other parts of nature:
since humans are destined to govern, according to Smith, they are given the capacities
suitable to doing so (including, in this case, a catholic sense of fellow-feeling).19
Human superiority is thus rooted in differences of capacity, and at least some of the
relevant differences are linguistic and cognitive.20 These cognitive differences
produce human minds that are uniquely suited to dominion over the inferior parts of
nature.

19

On human nature as not fixed for Smith, see Schliesser (2011).

These differences would seem to be ultimately rooted in biological differences for Smith—see
Phillipson (2013, 32)—but exploring Smith’s views on biology and its relation to mental capacity is
outside the scope of this paper. What is clear is that there are fundamental cognitive differences in
predisposition for linguistic activity, and whatever the ultimate origin of those differences, those
differences act to create separation between humans and non-human animals, which ramify to create
further cognitive and linguistic differences.
20
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Smith takes speech to be the key difference between humans and other
animals and as the trait most fundamental to understanding humanity.21 This,
combined with the extremely important role speech plays in our more sophisticated
cognitive capacities, suggests that human and non-human animal minds are different
in kind for Smith. So, while the explanations for the analogous parts of their
behavior are shared, the very different (e.g., linguistic, economic, moral) behavior
puts a difference in kind between human and non-human animal minds, for Smith.22
The question of difference in kind is, of course, a thorny one, particularly as
the question must itself be disambiguated before it can be answered. ‘Difference in
kind’ is traditionally contrasted with ‘difference in degree’: identifying minds as
different in kind is meant to assert that they differ by more than just the extent to
which they have certain shared capacities. It is, in short, to claim that they are disjoint
in their capabilities: some minds must have capacities that the others do not. The
greater the number of unshared capacities, the better the case for difference in kind.
Further, how important the shared (or not shared) capacities are to the execution of
a typical life by those creatures also matters: if the behaviors related to or enabled by
the different capacities are extraordinarily important for the creature in question,
then, ceteris paribus, the case for difference in kind is stronger.
On this understanding, Smith would qualify as taking human and non-human
animal minds to be different in kind as there are fundamental differences in
capacities between the two groups and those fundamental differences ramify to
produce very sophisticated mental abilities in one group that are not present in the
other.
Further, these cognitive capacities produce human society and the division of
labor, on which all of human economic activity is founded. They would also seem to
be implicated in, e.g., ability to assess and place blame, culpability for blameworthy
21

This is the case even though speech and the attendant reasoning capabilities might not be
fundamental; recall that Smith speculated that ‘the desire of being believed … seems to be one of the
strongest of all our natural desires’ in humans, and ‘perhaps, the instinct upon which is founded the
faculty of speech, the characteristical faculty of human nature’ (TMS VII.iv.25, p.397-8). While
reducing the number and kind of basic cognitive differences between humans and animals to a
minimum by here attributing only a difference in desire to be believed—which then goes on to
produce the differences in language, etc.—he still identifies speech as the more important faculty for
contrasting humanity with non-human animals.
In claiming a difference in kind, I am arguing contra Wolloch (2013). Wolloch argues that Smith sees
humans and non-human animals as differing merely in degree. Wolloch’s account acknowledges many
of the same comparisons and contrasts that I have pointed to here. However, it does not consider, as
this paper does, the extent of difference in cognitive capacities that the differences in the propensity
to speak introduce.
22
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actions, how well we imaginatively place ourselves in the situation of others and
sympathize with them—in short, all of the capacities relevant for morality.
In sum, radically different institutions and forms of life are eventually
brought about by the basic differences in capacities that Smith identifies, and those
institutions and forms of life are incredibly important to even average members of
the human species. Smith holds that human and non-human animal minds are,
ultimately, different in kind and that language enables and facilitates this difference.
This is not surprising for a professor who devoted much of his lecturing to rhetoric
and belles lettres because he that thought that ‘the best method of explaining and
illustrating the various powers of the human mind, the most useful part of
metaphysics, arises from an examination of the several ways of communicating our
thoughts by speech.’23

IV. HUME, CONTEXT, COMPARISON
This puts Smith in stark contrast with his countryman and friend, David Hume.
Hume goes out of his way in his sections on non-human animal minds (Treatise
1.3.16, 2.1.12 and 2.2.12 and EHU 9) to emphasize continuity between humans and
non-human animals, identifying the fundamental capacities relevant for navigating
the world (associations and causal reasoning) and engaging with others (the passions
and sympathy) as being shared.24 Hume is silent as to whether non-human animals
share with humans the capacities for some more sophisticated sorts of reasoning
(namely demonstrative and intuitive reasoning), but Hume also systematically
downplays the importance of such reasoning, playing up instead the importance of
the kinds of (causal) reasoning shared between humans and non-human animals.25
It is thus fair to say of Hume that he sees humans and non-human animals as
having minds that are of the same kind: Hume gives no account of humans and
non-human animals as having disjoint capacities, the capacities that may or may not
be shared (e.g., demonstrative reasoning) do not comprise a large proportion of the
mental faculties that humans have, nor are they important, on Hume’s estimation, for
leading a typical human life. Smith, remember, sees language as facilitating more
23

Millar, a pupil of Smith’s, attributes this view to him (see Stewart 1853, p.xvi). These lectures are
presented in Smith (1983).
I follow convention in citing Hume’s Treatise (Hume 2000) by section and paragraph number. For
instance, a reference to Treatise Book I, part 3, section 7, paragraph 5 would appear as ‘T 1.3.7.5.’
Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hume 1999) and Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals (Hume 1998) are cited by section and paragraph as EHU and EPM respectively.
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See Driver (2011) and Beauchamp (1998).
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abstract and metaphysical thinking. Hume, by contrast, sees the sort of thinking
enabled by these abstract and metaphysical terms as useless or, worse, completely
empty. 26
Nothing more strongly underscores how human and animal minds are
comparable for Hume than the fact that Hume’s arguments regarding animal
cognition are tightly wedded to his arguments about human cognition.27 Hume’s key
argument for the conclusion of Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 9 rests on the
claim that while ‘Animals are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are
children: Neither are the generality of mankind: Neither are philosophers
themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in the main, the same with the
vulgar’ (EHU 9.5).28
Further, Hume spends the long footnote to Enquiry 9.5 explaining why it is
contingent differences in mental acuity—and not differences in mental powers per se
—that explain the observed differences between individual humans with respect to
their abilities in this area and also the differences between humans and non-human
animals. Notably, language use is implicated only in passing in his final point about
testimony. The vast bulk of differences in reasoning ability, Hume takes it, can be
explained without any recourse to language.
There are two places in Hume’s wider corpus where he seems to compare
human mental faculties favorably to those of non-human animals. The first is in his
discussion of justice in the second Enquiry, where Hume says that considerations of
justice do not apply to human interactions with non-human animals (EPM 3.19).
However, this is not because they are not rational, nor even because their minds are
different from ours: like the imagined creatures of the thought experiment in the
previous paragraph, it is because weakness of body and mind makes it so that they
could ‘never make us feel the effects of their resentment’ (EPM 3.18). This speaks to
difference of degree. That degree of difference between humans and non-human
animals has consequences, but it alone does not make for a difference of kind.
Whereas Smith sees human dominion over animals as inevitable, given human
faculties, for Hume it is contingent on animals’ infirmity of reasoning and body. This
is a clear example of Smith seeing a difference of kind where Hume sees a difference
of degree.

One might have thought that language plays a crucial role in our cognition of objects, for Hume,
but this would require denying to non-human animals things Hume explicitly attributes to them. See
Butler (2010).
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On this connection, generally, see Boyle (2003) and Fry (forthcoming).

28

This same point applies, though less directly, to Treatise 1.3.16 as well.
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The second is his essay, ‘Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature.’
There, Hume evaluates the case for the conclusion that human nature is ‘mean’ or
base. In doing so, Hume gives a short catalogue of ways human thought surpasses
non-human animal thought. Many of the differences that Hume notes are
comparable to the differences that he gives in the long footnote cited above from the
first Enquiry, suggesting a difference in the strength of the cognitive powers between
the groups. Hume does go further, though, when he says that human thought is ‘not
limited by any narrow bounds, either of place or time,’ but that non-human animal
thought is ‘limited in its observations and reasonings to a few sensible objects which
surround it’ (DM 5).29 However, this difference does not make for a difference in
kind because, as Hume goes on to note, the quality of human and non-human
animal reasoning forms a spectrum; it is because we are able to selectively compare
only bits of that spectrum that humans sometimes come out looking sophisticated
(and sometimes not). This is all consistent with the connected hierarchy of reasoning
ability that Hume elucidated in Enquiry 9.5, where animals are comparable to children
and people leading their everyday lives. If we do not wish to saddle Hume with the
view that children’s minds are different in kind from adult humans’ minds—for
which there appears to be scant evidence in Hume’s texts—then we should take nonhuman animal minds to be similar in kind as well.
Hume and Smith, then, despite both seeing animals as having basic capacities
for reasoning, have notably different views on the ultimate status of non-human
animals. Neither position is unique in the time period, though the two positions are
affiliated with radically different cohorts. Though it is not possible to do justice to
the question of these other thinkers’ views here, seeing non-human animals as
different in kind from humans is the mainstream position, occupied by, e.g.,
Descartes, Leibniz, and Locke, to name a few. Hume’s position is more closely
affiliated with the skeptics; Montaigne and Bayle, for example, both seem to be
skeptical of attempts to draw a difference in kind between human and non-human
animal minds.30 So neither Smith nor Hume have views that are unprecedented,
though Hume’s are notably more outside the philosophical mainstream than Smith’s.

29

This echos some of Locke’s discussion of non-human animals in Essay II.xi. Fully exploring this
echo, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Hume’s ‘Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human
Nature’ is cited here by paragraph. Quotations are from Hume (1995).
Though on the differences of Hume’s arguments and conclusions from Montaigne and Bayle, see
Fry (forthcoming). Spinoza, another philosophical outsider in the period, is often interpreted as
thinking of human and non-human animal minds as fundamentally the same, but then again, they are
also fundamentally the same as, e.g., rocks, making him a tricky case, comparatively.
30
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This mirrors their positions with respect to the philosophical establishment
of the Scottish Enlightenment: Smith was much closer to the philosophical
establishment of the time than Hume was and had a more direct impact within it.
Smith was trained at Glasgow and then at Oxford; Hume, after his brief studies at
Edinburgh, where he did not take a degree, was largely self-taught. Smith went on to
hold, for a period, the Chair of Logic at Glasgow University before occupying the
prestigious Chair of Moral Philosophy. This chair had been previously held by
Francis Hutcheson and later went on to be held by Thomas Reid. Hume, by contrast,
was famously rebuffed for professorial positions at universities in Edinburgh and
Glasgow. Smith had students (e.g., Dugald Stewart) that went on to hold chairs and
professorships; Hume did not. By any measure, the formal philosophical
establishment of the time in Scotland counted Smith as one of their own while it
excluded Hume.31
It is surprising that Smith and Hume differ so radically from one another on
this issue, though. Both Smith and Hume develop their moral system in response to
Hutcheson, building on and embroidering that system in similar ways.32 Further,
both authors make extensive use of associationist psychology and both found their
picture of morality on the passions. Both authors take these associative abilities to be
shared between humans and non-human animals. But it is difference in speech ability
and the extensive story Smith has about the relationship of speech to cognition that
ultimately put a stark difference between human and non-human animal minds for
him. Given that both Smith and Hume think that animal cognition will be useful for
our thinking about morals, their starkly different views on the status of animals is
surprising, especially in light of their other agreements.
In no way do I mean to make a causal claim here, but it is clear that Smith’s
relatively more mainstream philosophical opinion is consistent with his relative
sociological positioning, and Hume’s more heterodox view is consistent with his
location outside that mainstream philosophical establishment. Further, Smith, who
evinced caginess with respect to engaging publicly on matters religious, also
presented a view that was at least largely consistent with commonly held religious
tenets: humans and non-human animals are different in kind and humankind’s

Rasmussen (2017) provides a panoptic view and comparison of Smith and Hume’s standing and
reception in the period; it also provides a view into the informal clubs and circles of the Scottish
Enlightenment, of which Hume, like Smith, was very much a fixture.
31
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Both regularly cite Hutcheson as an influence, but for more, on Hutcheson’s influence on Hume,
see Kemp Smith (2005, ch.2); on Smith, see Pesciarelli (1999); and see Vandenberg and DeHart (2013)
generally.
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dominion over animals assured.33 Hume’s view on animals, by contrast, was
associated with skepticism and irreligion, two charges consistently leveled at Hume
more generally. Their positions on animals set them apart from each other and
reflect how they are positioned with respect to the philosophical enlightenment of
Scotland at the time.

33

On Smith’s caginess, see Rasmussen (2017), especially chs. 3, 5 and 10.
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